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EXCISE

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NO: A-210

Ref: A-61

Sabena Manager ~~Deswarte claims he has no knowledge of~~ Sabena crash investigation report. Nottet, Chief of Administration Aeronautique and Chairman of investigation board states no official report will be issued until receipt of CAB investigation findings. Both officials express personal opinion that cause will not be determined.

FYI According to Frank Boas, local American lawyer representing estates of some victims, [redacted] Boas is not sure what form legal proceedings on behalf of victims will take, but it is entirely possible a statute of limitations of one year may apply. Therefore, absence of official findings would severely hamper pursuance of case. End FYI.

SECTION 552 (b)(5)

There has been no press comment or discussion of the crash for several months.

MACARTHUR

E MESSAGE CENTER CONTROL
DEC 6 IN 1961 CUT

DEC 19 11 56 AM '61 FILED

SESchneider:an:rgh 11/30/61

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3rd hypothesis.

The position was necessary to compensate for the failure of one of the other flight controls.

It should be examined if this 10 units nose up position was not initiated by the crew during the manoeuvres which followed the overshoot in order to find a position of equilibrium.

The efficiency of the elevator decrease during turns. As a matter of fact, the pitching component of the angular rotation speed causes a relative air flow which tends to create a nose down movement and this due to distance between the stabilizer and the center of gravity.

Under those conditions, the nose up tendency of the stabilizer must be increased. A 10 units nose up could be necessary in order to be "in trim" for a coordinated turn at speeds between 120 and 155 kts (40° to 60° bank, flaps down).

The requirement is less in the flaps up configuration (the maximum lift coefficient is reduced). It should not be more than 7 units in a 60° bank turn at the buffetspeed. The effect of the elevator being equal to 5.5 units of trim it follows that, in the final configuration, the equilibrium of the aircraft was only possible within tight limits of speed and bank angle.

The Commission does not dispose of precise data for lower speeds, but the setting required to maintain a balance would probably be more important. If one admits a linear variation of the coefficient of aerodinamic pitching moment as a function of the lift coefficient, one finds a setting of the order of 10 units nose up.

In conclusion, it does not seem that the probable cause of the accident can be attributed to a malfunctioning of the stabilizer; it could have been used for a steeply banked turn close to stallspeed.

Lateral controls.

Inboard ailerons.

In cruise, i.e. flaps retracted, the outboard ailerons are inoperative and inboard ailerons only are used. There were numerous cases of inboard ailerons in flight jamming write-ups in the trouble reports. The wreckage examination has disclosed that the inboard ailerons were deflected in such a direction as to produce a right bank without being possible to determine if the position was such before the impact or caused by it.

The aileron trim-cartridge was also showing a point where jamming occured and precisely preventing a right bank. This point was due to corrosion combined with insufficient clearance.

The cartridge corrosion deposit analysis was conducted by Boeing and leads to the conclusion that the corrosion was due to the effect of the fire subsequent to the crash.